Action models are semantic structures similar to Kripke models that represent a change in knowledge in an epistemic setting. Whereas the language of action model logic [8, 7] embeds the semantic structure of an action model directly within the language, this paper introduces a language that represents action models using syntactic operators inspired by relational actions [11, 12, 13] . This language admits an intuitive description of the action models it represents, and we show in several settings that it is sufficient to represent any action model up to a given modal depth and to represent the results of action model synthesis [19] , and give a sound and complete axiomatisation in some of these settings.
Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic describes the way knowledge can change in multiagent systems subject to informative actions taking place. For example, if Tim were to announce "I like cats", then everyone in the room would know the proposition Tim likes cats is true, and furthermore, everybody would know that this fact is common knowledge among the people in the room. This simple informative action is what is referred to as a public announcement [23] , and such actions of these have been extensively studied in epistemic logics. More complex actions can include private announcements (where some agents are oblivious to the informative action occurring), or a group announcement (where members of a group simultaneously make a truthful announcement to every other member of the group [1] ). These complex actions may be modelled and reasoned about using action models [8] which are effectively a semantic model of the change caused by an informative action. Consequently they are very useful for reasoning about the consequences of an informative action, but less well suited to reasoning about the action itself.
We present a language for describing epistemic actions syntactically. Complex actions may be built as an expression upon simpler primitive actions. This approach is a generalisation of the relational actions introduced by van Ditmarsch [12] . We show in several settings that this language is sufficient to represent any informative action represented by an action model (up to a given model depth), we present a synthesis result, and give a a sound and complete axiomatisation for some of these settings. The synthesis result is an important application of this work: given a desired state of knowledge among a group of agents, we are able to compute a complex informative action that will achieve that particular knowledge state (given it is consistent with the current knowledge of agents). We provided these results in a variety of modal logics suited to epistemic reasoning: K , K45 and S5 . Example 1.1 James, Ed and Tim submit a research grant proposal, and eagerly await the outcome. Is there a series of actions that will result in:
(i) Ed knowing the grant application was successful;
(ii) James not knowing whether the grant application was successful, but knowing that either Ed or Tim does know;
(iii) Tim does not know whether the grant application was successful, but knows that if the grant application was unsuccessful, then James knows that it was unsuccessful.
Such an epistemic state may be achieved by a series of messages: Ed is sent a message congratulating him on a successful application, James is sent a message informing him that at least one applicant on each grant has been informed of the outcome, and Tim is sent a message informing him that the first investigator of all unsuccessful grants has been notified.
After establishing some technical preliminaries (Section 2) we present a syntactic approach for describing informative actions (Sections 3 and 4), provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of the language (Section 5) and provide a correspondence result between this language and action models (Section 6), give a computational method for synthesising actions to achieve an epistemic goal (Section 7).
L ⊗∀ is a finite set of formulae. We note that the modal operators a , ✸a and ∇ a are interdefineable as a ϕ ↔ ∇ a {ϕ} ∨ ∇ a ∅ and ✸aϕ ↔ ∇ a {ϕ, ⊤}. This is the basis for the axiomatisations of refinement modal logic and arbitrary action model logic, and plays an important part in our correspondence and synthesis results. This was previously used as the basis of several axiomatisations of refinement modal logics [15, 20, 18, 21, 10, 19] .
We refer to the language L ⊗ of action model logic, which is L ⊗∀ without the ∀ operator, the language L ∀ of refinement modal logic, which is L ⊗∀ without the [M T ] operator, the language L of modal logic, which is L ⊗ without the [M T ] operator, and the language L 0 of propositional logic, which is L without the a operator. forth-a For every t ∈ sR a there exists t ′ ∈ s ′ R ′ a such that (t, t ′ ) ∈ R.
back-a For every t ′ ∈ s ′ R ′ a there exists t ∈ sR a such that (t, t ′ ) ∈ R. If (s, s ′ ) ∈ R then we call M s and M forth-n-a If n > 0 then for every t ∈ sR a there exists
The modal depth of ϕ, written as d(ϕ), is defined recursively as follows:
The relation ↔ n is an equivalence relation on Kripke models.
These are well-known results. 
Definition 2.15 [B-bisimilarity of Kripke models] Let
A B-restricted formula is defined by the following abstract syntax:
This result is trivial. We recall the semantics of action model logic of Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8, 7] . Definition 2.18 [Semantics of action model logic] Let C be a class of Kripke models, let M = (S , R, V ) ∈ C be a Kripke model and let M ∈ AM be an action model.
We first define action model execution. We denote the result of executing the action model M on the Kripke model M as M ⊗ M, and we define the result
where:
We also define multi-pointed action model execution as
Then the interpretation of ϕ ∈ L ⊗ in the logic C ⊗ is the same as its interpretation in the modal logic C given in Definition 2.5, with the additional inductive case:
We also define sequential action of
Definition 2.20 [Bisimilarity of action models] Let M = (S, R, pre) ∈ AM and
is a bisimulation if and only if for every a ∈ A and (s, s ′ ) ∈ R the following conditions hold:
forth-a For every t ∈ sR a there exists
The relation ↔ is an equivalence relation on action models.
These results are shown by Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8, 7] . Definition 2.24 [n-bisimilarity of action models] Let n ∈ N, and let 
forth-n-a If n > 0 then for every t ∈ sR a there exists
The relation ↔ n is an equivalence relation on action models.
These results follow from similar reasoning to the results for n-bisimilarity of Kripke models. 
Definition 2.29 [B-bisimilarity of action models] Let
This result follows from similar reasoning to the results for B-bisimilarity of Kripke models. Definition 2.31 [Axiomatisation AML K ] The axiomatisation AML K is a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of K along with the axioms:
and the rule: These results are shown by Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8, 7] . We note that the completeness and expressive equivalence results follow from the fact that AML K forms a set of reduction axioms which give a provably correct translation from L ⊗ to L.
We note that the same results hold for the logics K45 ⊗ and S5 ⊗ if we extend AML K with the additional axioms of K45 and S5 and restrict the language to only include AM K45 and AM S5 action models respectively, given the following results. 
The relation ← is a preorder on Kripke models.
These results are shown by van Ditmarsch and French [14] . 
The semantics of arbitrary action model logic are given by Hales [19] , which are a combination of the semantics of action model logic of Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8, 7] and the semantics of refinement modal logic of van Ditmarsch and French [14] .
As noted earlier, the action model logics K ⊗ , K45 ⊗ and S5 ⊗ are expressively equivalent to their underlying modal logics via a provably correct translation. Similarly it was shown by Bozzelli, et al. [10] and Hales, French and Davies [21] that the refinement modal logics K ∀ , KD45 ∀ and S5 are expressively equivalent to their underlying modal logics, also via a provably correct translation. We note that the same result for K45 ∀ can be shown similarly to the result for KD45 ∀ . In axiomatising K ⊗∀ , Hales [19] simply noted that the rules and axioms of AML K and RML K are sound in K ⊗∀ and that the provably correct translations for K ⊗ and K ∀ can be simply combined to form a provably correct translation for K ⊗∀ . We reproduce the axiomatisation for K ⊗∀ here, and note that the same similar reasoning to [19] gives sound and complete axiomatisations and provably correct translations for K45 ⊗∀ and S5 ⊗∀ , which we also list here.
Definition 2.40 [Disjunctive normal form] A formula in disjunctive normal form is defined by the following abstract syntax:
where π ∈ L 0 , B ⊆ A and for every b ∈ B, Γ b is a finite set of formulae in disjunctive normal form. 
and the rule:
The additional axioms for AAML K are the additional axioms from RML K for refinement modal logic, given by Bozzelli, et al. [10] . 
where π ∈ L 0 , B ⊆ A \ {a} and for every b ∈ B, Γ b is a finite set of formulae in b-alternating disjunctive normal form.
A formula in alternating disjunctive normal form is defined by the following abstract syntax:
where π ∈ L 0 , B ⊆ A and for every b ∈ B, Γ b is a finite set of formulae in b-alternating disjunctive normal form.
The additional axioms for AAML K45 are adapted from the additional axioms from RML KD45 for refinement doxastic logic, given by Hales, French and Davies [21] . The axioms do not require that each Γ a be non-empty, which is due to the lack of seriality in the setting of K45 .
Proposition 2.46 Every formula of L is equivalent to a formula in alternating disjunctive normal form under the semantics of K45.
This is shown by Hales, French and Davies [21] for KD45, however the same reasoning applies to K45.
is a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of AML K45 along with the rules and axioms R, RP and NecR of AAML K and the axioms:
where for every a ∈ A, Γ a is a finite set of a-alternating disjunctive normal formulae.
The additional axioms for AAML K45 are the additional axioms from RML K45 for refinement epistemic logic, given by Hales, French and Davies [21] .
The additional axioms for AAML K45 are adapted from the additional axioms from RML KD45 for refinement modal logic, given by Hales, French and Davies [21] . The axioms do not require that each Γ a be non-empty, which is due to the lack of seriality in the setting of K45 .
Proposition 2.48
The axiomatisation AAML K45 is sound and complete for the logic K45 ⊗∀ .
Proposition 2.49 The logic K45 ⊗∀ is expressively equivalent to the logic K45.
These results follow from similar reasoning to the same results in K ⊗∀ . Definition 2.50 [Explicit formulae] Let π ∈ L 0 be a propositional formula, let γ 0 ∈ L be a modal formula and for every a ∈ A let Γ a ⊆ L be a finite set of formulae such that γ 0 ∈ Γ a . Let Ψ = {ψ ≤ γ | a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γ a } be the set of subformulae of the formulae in each set Γ a . Finally let ϕ be a formula of the form
Then ϕ is an explicit formula if and only if the following conditions hold:
(ii) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γ a , a ψ ∈ Ψ: ⊢ S5 γ → a ψ if and only if for every
Proposition 2.51 Every formula of L is equivalent to a disjunction of explicit formulae under the semantics of S5.
This is shown by Hales, French and Davies [21] .
Definition 2.52 [Axiomatisation AAML S5 ] The axiomatisation AML S5 is a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of AML S5 along with the rules and axioms R, RP and NecR of AAML K and the axioms:
where γ 0 ∧ a∈A ∃∇ a Γ a is an explicit formula and for every a ∈ A, γ 0 ∧ ∇ a Γ a is an explicit formula.
Proposition 2.53
The axiomatisation AAML S5 is sound and complete for the logic S5 ⊗∀ .
Proposition 2.54 The logic S5 ⊗∀ is expressively equivalent to the logic S5.
These results follow from similar reasoning to the same results in K ⊗∀ .
Syntax
Definition 3.1 [Language of arbitrary action formula logic] The language L ?∀ of arbitrary action formula logic is inductively defined as:
where p ∈ P , a ∈ A and α ∈ L ?∀ act , and where the language L ?∀ act of arbitrary action formulae is inductively as:
where ϕ ∈ L ?∀ and ∅ ⊂ B ⊆ A.
We use all of the standard abbreviations for arbitrary action model logic, in addition to the abbreviations
We denote non-deterministic choice (⊔) over a finite set of action formula
act by ∆ and we denote sequential execution (⊗) of a finite, nonempty sequence of action formulae (
and define them in the obvious way.
We refer to the languages L ? of action formula logic and L ? act of action formulae, which are L ?∀ and L ?∀ act respectively, both without the ∀ operator, As in the action model logic [7] , the intended meaning of the operator [α]ϕ is that "ϕ is true in the result of any successful execution of the action α". In the following section we define the semantics of the action formula logic in terms of action model execution. For each setting of K , K45 and S5 we provide a function τ C : L ? act → AM of translating action formulae from L ? act into action models. The result of executing an action α ∈ L ?
act is determined by translating α into an action model τ C (α) ∈ AM C , and then executing the action model in the usual way.
In each setting we have attempted to define the translation from action formulae into action models in such a way that the action formulae carry an intuitive description of the action that is performed by the corresponding action model. We call the ? operator the test operator, and describe the action ?ϕ as a test for ϕ. A test is intended to restrict the states in which an action can successfully execute to states where the condition ϕ is true initially, but otherwise leaves the state unchanged. We call the ⊔ operator the non-deterministic choice operator, and describe the action α ⊔ β as a non-deterministic choice between α and β. We call the ⊗ operator the sequential execution operator, and describe the action α ⊗ β as an execution of α followed by β. Finally we call L B the learning operator, and describe the action L B (α, β) as the agents in B learning that the actions α or β occurred. This action is intended to result in the agents B knowing or believing what would be true if α or β were executed. For example, if a consequence of executing α is that ϕ is true in the result, then the intention is that a consequence of executing L a (α, α) is that a ϕ is true in the result. As we will see, this property is generally true in K ? , however due to the extra frame conditions of K45 and S5 it is only true for some formulae ϕ in K45 ? and S5 ? .
Example 3.2 If p stands for the proposition "the grant application was successful" then the action described in Example 1.1 might be written in the form of an action formula as:
Semantics
We now define the semantics of arbitrary action formula logic. As mentioned earlier, the semantics are defined by translating action formulae into action models. The translation used varies in each class of K , K45 and S5 that we work in, according to the frame conditions in each class. Therefore our semantics are parameterised by a function τ C : L ? act → AM that will vary according to the class of Kripke models.
Definition 4.1 [Semantics of arbitrary action formula logic] Let C be a class of Kripke models, let τ C : L ? act → AM be a function from action formulae to multi-pointed action models, and let M = (S , R, V ) ∈ C be a Kripke model.
Then the interpretation of ϕ ∈ L ?∀ in the logic C ?∀ is the same as its interpretation in modal logic given in Definition 2.5, with the additional inductive cases:
where action model execution ⊗ is as defined in Definition 2.18 and the refinement relation is defined in Definition 2.36.
We note that the semantics of arbitrary action formula logic C ?∀ are very similar to the semantics of arbitrary action model logic C ⊗∀ [19] . We generalise the semantics to the classes of K , K45 and S5 by introducing the parameterised class C and restricting successful updates to those that result in C models as in the approach of Balbiani, et al [5] . The difference is that as actions are specified in L ?∀ formulae as action formulae, then the semantics must first translate the action formulae into action models before performing action model execution. As such there is a semantically correct translation from L ?∀ formulae to L ⊗∀ formulae (by replacing occurrences of α with τ C (α)), and any validities, axioms or results from arbitrary action model logic also apply in this setting if the language is restricted to action models that are defineable by action formulae. Therefore for the current section and the following sections concering the axiomatisations (Section 5) and correspondence results (Section 6), we will deal only with the action formula logic, rather than the full arbitrary action formula logic, focussing on the differences and correspondences between action formulae and action models, rather than getting distracted by the refinement quantifiers which behave identically between each logic. We return to the full arbitrary action formula logic in Section 7 for the synthesis results.
We give the following general result.
Proposition 4.2 Let C be a class of Kripke models. For every
In the following subsections we will give definitions for τ K , τ K45 and τ S5 . These functions vary according to the class of Kripke models being used. When the class is clear from context, then we will simply write τ instead of τ C .
We begin by giving a definition of τ for translating actions involving nondeterministic choice and sequential execution. These definitions are common to all of the settings we are working in.
We give some properties of non-deterministic choice and sequential execution of action formulae.
act and ϕ ∈ L ? . Then the following are valid in K ? , K45 ? and S5 ? :
These validities follow trivially from the semantics of C ?∀ and Definitions 4.3 and 4.4.
In the following subsections we give definitions of τ C for translating action formulae involving tests and learning in the settings of K , K45 and S5 . We note that in each subsection the constructions of action models used to define tests and learning closely resemble the constructions of refinements used to show the soundness of axioms in refinement modal logic [10, 21] .
. Let test and skip be new states not appearing in S α . We define τ (L B (α, α)) = M T = ((S, R, pre), T) where:
We note that the syntax of action formula logic defines the learning operator as a binary operator that can be applied to two different action formulae, however in the setting of K and K45 we only give a direct definition of τ for actions of the form L B (α, α) and define the more general case in terms of this. Intuitively L B (α, β) is intended to represent an action where the agents in B
K45
. We define τ (?ϕ) as in Definition 4.6 for K .
. Let test and skip be new states not appearing in S α . For every t α ∈ T α lett α be a new state not appearing in S α . We call eacht α a proxy state for t α . We define τ (L B (α, α)) = M T = ((S, R, pre), T) where:
We note that the definition for τ given here varies considerably from the definition given in the setting of K due to the presence of the proxy states.
The proxy states are introduced due to the additional frame constraints in K45 and the desire that the action models constructed by τ be AM K45 action models. In constructing τ (L B α) we wish to construct an action model with a root state whose B-successors are the root states of τ (α), so that the result of executing the action L B α is that the agents B believe that the action α has occurred. However in order for this construction to result in a AM K45 action model, we must take the transitive, Euclidean closure of the B-successors of the root state. If we were to perform a construction similar to that used in the setting of K where proxy states are not used, then this would mean that the for every b ∈ B, the b-successors of the root state would include all of the b-successors of the root states, and not just the root states themselves. To show why this is not desireable, consider the simple example of the action L a ?ϕ. The intention is that this action represents a private announcement to a that ϕ is true, as it is in the setting of K . Without using proxy states, if we wanted to include the state test in the a-successors of the root state of τ (α) then in order to construct a AM K45 action model we would need to take the transitive,
Euclidean closure of the a-successors of test. As skip is an a-successor of test in the action ?ϕ, then this would mean that a would not be able to distinguish between the actions states test and skip and so the result of executing τ (α) would be that a learns nothing. With the construction provided, the action L a ?ϕ gives the desired result that a learns that ϕ is true.
We also note that the results presented in this paper for K45 can be extended to KD45 by modifying Definition 4.9 so that pre(test) = a∈B t α ∈T α ✸apre α (t α ), which guarantees that the result of successfully executing an action formula has the seriality property of KD45 .
S5
We define τ (L B (α, β)) = M T = ((S, R, pre), T) where:
We note that as in the setting of K45 the definition of τ uses proxy states
to construct action models from learning operators. However unlike in the settings of K and K45 this construction does not introduce the new states test and skip. As discussed earlier this is because in the setting of S5 , in an action where agents learn that α or β have occurred, one of those actions must have actually occurred. Unlike in the settings of K and K45 we have distinguished between the actions α and β, designating that α is the action that has actually occurred. We also note that the definition of τ for test operators is different from that used in K and K45 , simply to account for the additional frame constraints of S5 .
Axiomatisation
In the following subsections we give sound and complete axiomatisations for the action formulae logic in the settings of K and K45 . In the setting of S5 we provide a sound but not complete axiomatisation, and comment on the difficulty of giving a complete axiomatisation and the possible alternatives. We note that axiomatisations for arbitrary action formula logic in these settings can be derived trivially from these axiomatisations by adding the additional axioms and rules from refinement modal logic.
The axiomatisation AFL K is a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of K along with the axioms:
Proof. LT follows from applying the reduction axioms of AML K inductively to [?ϕ]ψ. LU and LS follow from Proposition 4.5. Let τ (L b (α, β)) = M s = ((S, R, pre), s). LP, LN and LC follow trivially from the AML K axioms AP, AN and AC respectively, noting from Definition 4.7 that pre(s) = ⊤. LK1 follows trivially from the AML K axiom AK, noting from Definition 4.7 that as a ∈ A then M sR a ↔ τ (α ⊔ β). NecL follows trivially from the AML K rule NecA. LK2 follows trivially from the AML K axiom AK, noting from Definition 4.7 that as a / ∈ A then M sR a ↔ τ (?⊤). ✷
Proposition 5.3
The axiomatisation AFL K is complete for the logic K ⊗ .
We note that the axiomatisation AFL K forms a set of reduction axioms that gives a provably correct translation from L ? to L.
Example 5. 4 We give an example derivation that the action formula α given in Example 3.2 does indeed satisfy (part of) the epistemic goal stated in Example 1.1.
(1) follows from LT, (3) follows from NecK and (4) follows from LK1.
Similarly we have
(5) follows from LU, (6) follows from NecK and (7) follows from LK1. (8) follows from LS and LK2. Therefore a consequence of successfully executing α is that James learns that Ed or Tim knows whether the grant application was successful.
K45
Definition 5.5 [Axiomatisation AFL K45 ] The axiomatisation AFL K45 is a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of K45 along with the rules and axioms of AFL K , but substituting the AFL K axiom LK1 for the axiom:
where χ is a (A \ {a})-restricted formula.
Proposition 5.6
The axiomatisation AFL K45 is sound in the logic K45 ⊗ .
Proof. Soundness of LT, LU, LS, LP, LN, LC, LK2
and NecL follow from the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 5.2. LK1 follows from the AML K45 axiom AK. We note that as a ∈ B, from Definition 4.9 we have M sR a ↔ (A\{a}) τ (α ⊔ β), and as χ is (A \ {a})-restricted
The axiomatisation AFL K45 is complete for the logic K45 ⊗ .
We note that the axiomatisation AFL K45 forms a set of reduction axioms that gives a provably correct translation from L ? to L. To translate a subformula [α]ϕ, where ϕ ∈ L, we must first translate ϕ to the alternating disjunctive normal form of [21] , which gives the property that for every subformula a ψ, the formula ψ is (A \ {a})-restricted, and therefore LK1 is applicable.
S5
Definition 5.8 [Axiomatisation AFL S5 ] The axiomatisation AFL S5 is a substitution schema consisting of the rules and axioms of S5 along with the axioms:
where χ is a (A \ {a})-restricted formula. α, β) ) to the consequences of τ (α ⊔ β). Given the correspondence results of the previous section, it should be possible to construct an action formula that is n-bisimilar to the B-successors of τ (L B (α, β)), where d(ϕ) = n, and define axioms for LK1 and LK2 in terms of this action formula and not α ⊔ β. However translating L ? formulae into L ⊗ formulae and then using the axiomatisation AML S5 would certainly be simpler.
Correspondence
In the following subsections we show the correspondence between action formulae and action models in the settings of K , K45 and S5 . In each setting we show that action formulae are capable of representing any action model up to n-bisimilarity.
K
To begin we give two lemmas to simplify the construction that we will use for our correspondence result in K .
act where
and M s = ((S, R, pre), s) ∈ AM such that sR a = {t} for some t ∈ S and
Proof. By induction on n. Suppose that n = 0. Let α =?pre(s) and
Suppose that n > 0. By the induction hypothesis, for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sR a there exists α
. Then from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2:
We note for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sR a that M ′ s a,t ↔ M a,t s a,t as for every a ∈ A, u ∈ S a,t we have uR ′ a = uR a,t a . We show that (M s , M ′ s ′ ) satisfies atoms, forth-n-a and back-n-a for every a ∈ A.
atoms By construction pre ′ (s ′ ) = pre(s).
forth-n-a Let t ∈ sR a . By construction s a,t ∈ s ′ R ′ a , by the induction hypothesis M t ↔ (n−1) M a,t s a,t and from above M a,t
back-n-a Follows from similar reasoning to forth-n-a.
Proof. act . ✷
K45
As in the previous subsection we give a lemma to simplify the construction that we will use, although as the definition of τ (?ϕ) is the same between K and K45 we simply reuse Lemma 6.1 from the previous subsection.
. Then from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.6:
As in the proof of Proposition 6.3, we note for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sR a that M ′ s a,t ↔ M a,t s a,t . We need to show that (M s , M ′ s ′ ) satisfies atoms, forth-n-a and back-n-a for every a ∈ A. We use reasoning similar to the proof of Proposition 6.3, however noting that the successors of s ′ in M ′ are not the same as in the construction used previously. We claim that eachs a,t state is (n − 1)-bisimilar to the corresponding s a,t state. We show this by showing for every 0
.
back-i-b Follows similar reasoning to forth-i-b.
Therefore for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sR a we have that M ′ s a,t ↔ (n−1) M ′ s a,t . We can now show that M s ↔ n M ′ s ′ by using the same reasoning as the proof for Proposition 6.3, using the (
S5
Once more we give two lemmas to simplify the construction that we will use.
and M s = ((S, R, pre), s) ∈ AM such that sR a = {s} and pre(s) = ⊤. Then let
We note that unlike the constructions used for Proposition 6.3 and Proposition 6.7, this construction does not have
a . Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.7 we claim that each s a,t state is (n − 1)-bisimilar to the corresponding s t state. However in lieu of bisimilarity of S a,t states we need another result for these states. We also need to consider the additional state s ′ , which due to reflexivity is also a successor of itself.
We need to show for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1:
We proceed by induction on i. (
Then by the inner induction hypothesis this implies
. 
. By construction pre ′ (u) = pre a,t (u) and therefore ⊢ pre ′ (u) ↔ pre(v).
forth-i-b Suppose that 0 < i ≤ n − 1. Let w ∈ uR Therefore for every a ∈ A, t ∈ sR a we have that M
We can now show that M s ′ ↔ n M s by using the same reasoning as the proof for Proposition 6.3, using the (
Synthesis
In the following subsections we give a computational method for synthesising action formulae to achieve epistemic goals, whenever those goals are achievable. We note that the notion of when an epistemic goal is achievable is captured by the refinement quantifiers of refinement modal logic [14, 10] , which are also included in the arbitrary action formula logic, and so in this section we will refer to the full arbitrary action formula logic, keeping in mind the correspondence with arbitrary action model logic mentioned in Section 4.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that ϕ is in disjunctive normal form. We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Suppose that ϕ = ψ ∨ χ. By the induction hypothesis there exists
(9) follows from the induction hypothesis and (10) follows from LU. Further:
(11) follows from the induction hypothesis, (12) follows from LU and (13) follows from R. (20) follows from RK, (21) follows from the induction hypothesis, (22) follows from LU, (23) follows from LK1, LK2 and LS, (24) and (25) follow from LT, and (26) follows from (19) , RP LC and the definition of the cover operator. Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that ϕ is a disjunction of explicit formulae. We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Suppose that ϕ = ψ ∨ χ. We use the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 7.1.
Suppose that ϕ = π ∧ γ 0 ∧ a∈A ∇ a Γ a is an explicit formula. By the induction hypothesis for every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γ a there exists α
. Then from Lemmas 6.10 and 6.11: τ (α) ↔ M s = ((S, R, pre), s) where:
We need to show for every ψ ∈ Ψ:
We proceed by induction on ψ.
Suppose that ψ = p where p ∈ P . This follows trivially from AP. Suppose that ψ = ¬χ or that ψ = χ 1 ∧ χ 2 . These cases follow trivially from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ψ = a χ. By construction sR a =s ]χ. and as
Suppose that ψ = a χ. By constructions a,γ R a = {s} ∪ {s a,γ | δ ∈ Γ a } and s a,γ R a = s a,γ R a,γ a . As ϕ is an explicit formula and a χ ∈ Ψ then either (iii) For every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γ a , u ∈ S a,γ :
u ]ψ. Suppose that ψ = p where p ∈ P . This follows trivially from AP. Suppose that ψ = ¬χ or that ψ = χ 1 ∧ χ 2 . These cases follow trivially from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ψ = a χ. By construction uR a = uR As ϕ is an explicit formula, from RDist, RS5 and RComm we have that ∃ϕ → π ∧ a∈A,γ∈Γa ✸a∃γ. By construction for every a ∈ A, γ ∈ Γ a we have pre(s a,γ ) = ∃γ and from above we have ⊢ [M s a,γ ]γ therefore ⊢ ∃ϕ → π ∧ a∈A,γ∈Γa ✸a Msa,γ γ. Therefore by AK we have ⊢ ∃ϕ → M s (π∧ a∈A,γ∈Γa ✸aγ). 
Related work
Several other papers have addressed the problem of describing and reasoning about epistemic actions. One of the most important works in this area is the work of Baltag, Moss and Solecki [8] which introduced the notion of action model logic, building on the earlier work of Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [17] . In later work Baltag and Moss extended action model logic to consider epistemic programs [7] which are expressions built from action models using such operators as sequential composition, non-deterministic choice and iteration. The atoms of these programs are action models, so the approach is still inherently semantic in nature. The logic is unable to decompose the program beyond the level of the atoms, which themselves may be complex semantic objects. The relational actions of van Ditmarsch [12] provides a syntactic mechanism for describing an epistemic action, and provides the foundation for a lot of the work presented in this paper. The relational actions are constructed using essentially the same operators as in the language of action formulae. While the language is very similar, the semantics given are quite different [16] . In the logic of epistemic actions the semantics are given in such a way that worlds in a model are specified with respect to subsets of agents, so that the model is restricted to agents for whom the epistemic action was applied. The semantics were also specific to S5 , and non-trivial to generalise to other epistemic logics. A version of relational actions with concurrency is able to describe any S5 action model, although it is unknown whether the expressivity of concurrent relational actions is greater than that of action models [6] . Here we have generalised the approach and provided a correspondence theorem for action model logic. This has allowed us to retain the more familiar semantics of epistemic logic, generalise the logic to K and K45 as well as access existing synthesis results for dynamic epistemic logic [19] .
The synthesis result presented here is built on the work of Hales [19] which gave a method to build an action model to satisfy a given epistemic goal. This construction inspired the syntactic description of epistemic actions and approach that we have used in this paper.
Related synthesis results have been given by Aucher, et al. [2, 3, 4] which presents an event model language and uses it to give a thorough exploration of the relationship between epistemic models, action models and epistemic goals. Aucher defines a logic for action models and provides calculi to describe epistemic progression (what is true after executing a given action in a given model) epistemic regression (what is the most general precondition for an epistemic action given an epistemic goal) and epistemic planning (what action is sufficient to achieve an epistemic goal given some precondition). In future work we hope to extend the correspondence between action formula logic and action models to include Aucher's event model language.
